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Abstract 
Usability is an important concept that seems to receive less attention than it deserves 
outside of the core Human-Computer Interaction community. The reason for this 
apparent lack of interest may stem from an overly instrumental orientation towards 
usability that does not appeal to more socially oriented researchers. Three central 
criteria for usability, as reflected in the contemporary literature, are the effectiveness, 
efficiency and satisfaction with which users can achieve specified goals. These criteria 
are often expressed in terms of achieving goals, which, at least tacitly, seem to be 
restricted to goals related to an instrumental view on the use of IT. To broaden this 
view, the paper elaborates on how the concept of usability can be understood and used 
within a social action context. How social goals are related to the effectiveness, 
efficiency and satisfaction criteria is addressed specifically. It is argued that in order to 
truly understand usability, we must consider both instrumental and social goals since 
their combination constitute a fundamental part of the social action context in which 
systems are used. Both instrumental and social goals affect the way systems and use-
situations are designed and conceived. Interpreting usability from this broad social 
action perspective may be a way to make the concept more accepted throughout the 
wide variety of areas dealing with the design of IT systems. 
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Introduction 
 
Arguably, one of the most important qualities related to the use of information 
technology (IT) is the usability achieved in actual use-situations (Bevan, 1995; 
Maguire, 2001). Usability is a well-established concept and also one that is being 
recognized as an international standard (ISO 9241-11, 1998): ‘the extent to which a 
product can be used by specified users to achieve specified goals with effectiveness, 
efficiency and satisfaction in a specified context of use’. Clearly, this definition 
promotes a broad perspective on usability, identifying it with the ability to use an IT 
system for its intended purposes. The fact that it is an international standard also paves 
the way for managers to point at usability as something concrete and important to pay 
attention to (Bevan, 2001). 
The concept of usability should be understood in the light of several scholars arguing 
for a broad, contextual perspective on the use of IT (e.g. Winograd and Flores, 1987; 
Hirschheim et al., 1996; Kuutti, 1996; Ehn and Löwgren, 1997; Flores, 1998). Broad in 
the sense of not primarily viewing IT system use as goal-seeking behaviour based on 
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means/ends rationality, but as part of a larger social context in which interpersonal 
relationships are established and maintained. Unfortunately, usability is often thought 
of and applied in an overly instrumental and restricted way. The prevalent view of the 
use of IT, as reflected in contemporary work on usability, seems to focus entirely on 
desired outcome, and thus neglecting other socially oriented aspects of IT use.  
As an example, let us take a look at the use of an automatic teller machine (ATM). The 
primary goal of using an ATM seems rather obvious: to get some money out of it. 
Maguire (2001), when arguing the importance of context in usability studies, describes 
the ATM use-situation as consisting of, a bank customer as primary user, the ATM as 
such (an IT system), and, among others, the task of obtaining money. Of course, all of 
these are important factors, but, if we look more carefully at this use-situation, we can 
observe that there is also another actor involved – the bank, on whose behalf the ATM 
acts as an agent. The bank, as an institution, can be seen as a social actor performing 
social action, which is made manifest by financial transactions taking place at the ATM 
user interface (Goldkuhl and Ågerfalk, 2002). Therefore it seems fruitful to view the 
use-situation from a social action perspective, in terms of Weber (1978) and Habermas 
(1984). When taking social action (i.e. intentional behaviour that is oriented to the 
behaviour of others) as starting-point for understanding this use-situation, we must 
consider not only the instrumental goal of fetching the money, but also social goals 
which are related to social norms (Stamper et al., 2000). If the only thing that mattered 
was to efficiently obtain money, we did not, for example, need to design a system 
prohibiting unauthorized people from getting money from it. This means that we cannot 
only analyse, for example, how efficiently a user can use the ATM, we must also 
discuss whether it is used in a socially acceptable way. This is important to recognize 
because ATMs are built for honest and decent people, and they have features to protect 
them from misuse by dishonest people. Of course, since the tacit norms governing 
social action are a naturally institutionalized part of our life it is obvious for everyone 
that an ATM has to be protected from unauthorized use. However, it ought to be 
important to explicate such tacit norms and social goals related to them. This is 
important since norms and social goals affect how the whole use-situation, including 
the ATM, is designed, and as a consequence they are also important for understanding 
the usability of the ATM.  
The restricted instrumental interpretation of usability seems to have encouraged many 
researchers more or less to abandon the concept in favour of other, more socially 
oriented metaphors. One prominent example of this is the formulation and evolution of 
the field known as Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW) in the mid to late 
1980’s. From its inception, CSCW has emphasized the social aspects of IT (Schmidt 
and Bannon, 1992), revolting against the traditional human factors approach from 
which the concept of usability once evolved (Shackel, 1997); an approach  in which 
‘the human is often reduced to being another system component, with certain 
characteristics, such as limited attention span, faulty memory, etc. that need to be 
factored into the design equation for the overall human-machine system.’ (Bannon, 
1991) Another example is the relentless introduction of new ‘-bilities’ (or adoption of 
existing ones from neighbouring disciplines), such as sociability (Preece, 2000), 
communicability (Prates et al., 2000) and actability (Goldkuhl and Ågerfalk, 2002), to 
overcome purported limitations of the usability concept. 
Nonetheless, taking a social action theoretic stance to understand IT-mediated social 
activity does not preclude the notion of usability. Still, as indicated by the introduction 
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of new ‘-bilities’, the interest in the usability concept seems limited in the more socially 
oriented IT research communities. For example, a search for the term ‘usability’ among 
abstracts, titles and keywords of 1997 ff. issues of the leading CSCW journal, 
Computer Supported Cooperative Work, on 14 November 2003 resulted in only two 
matches. The same search of Information Technology and People, a journal focusing on 
social and organizational strategies in the design and use of information technology, 
resulted in zero matches (although a full-text search returned 15 articles). Zero matches 
were the result also for the more general Journal of Information Technology. Notably, 
the same search of three prominent representatives of the more ‘traditional’ human-
computer interaction journals, International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, 
Interacting with Computers and Behaviour and Information Technology resulted in 39, 
56 and 42 articles, respectively. Although anything but comprehensive, this survey at 
least indicates the apparent non-use of the usability concept outside the core human-
computer interaction community.   
In this paper, we show how usability can be re-interpreted from a social action theoretic 
perspective and thus potentially serve as the important concept in IT design that it 
deserves. This is done by addressing how social goals are related to effectiveness, 
efficiency and satisfaction, three central criteria for the contemporary understanding of 
usability (ISO 9241-11, 1998; van Welie et al., 1999; Maguire, 2001; Bevan, 1999; 
2001). Frøkjær et al. (2000) direct attention towards the correlation between the three 
criteria, and find it to be rather weak. Based on this finding they conclude that ‘there is 
no substitute for including all three aspects in usability evaluations’ (Frøkjær et al., 
2000, p. 351). Frøkjær et al. (2000) further argue that when using a narrower selection 
of usability measures, evaluators run an obvious risk of ignoring important aspects of 
usability. Inspired by that conclusion, this paper directs attention towards the more 
fundamental question of the interpretation of these criteria. Even though they are 
necessary, is the common interpretation of effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction, as 
reflected in the contemporary usability literature really sufficient when viewing IT as a 
tool for social action? If not, can they be reinterpreted in a way so that usability, in 
terms of the ISO definition, can be understood from a broader social action perspective?   
The discussion is exemplified and concretized through a further analysis of the 
commonly recognized and understood case of the ATM use-situation, and through a 
reanalysis of a case study previously reported by Ågerfalk (2004). The aim of the ATM 
analysis is not to criticize the contemporary design of ATMs but to highlight the tacit 
norms implemented in them, and social goals related to them. Admittedly, the amount 
of theory introduced in this paper may be a bit overwhelming for understanding ATM-
use. However, norms are important for all IT systems (Stamper, 1996; Stamper et al., 
2000) and the ATM has been chosen as an example on the basis of it being a commonly 
used system that most readers are likely to be familiar with. The second example is 
drawn from a case study on a system for booking resources (rooms, equipment, et 
cetera) in a large manufacturing organization. This case directs attention to the need to 
understand the interplay between instrumental and social goals in order to assess the 
usability of an IT system used in the daily running of an organization. 
The paper is structured as follows. First, the contemporary understanding of usability 
following ISO 9241-11 (1998) is elaborated and argued to be too instrumentally 
oriented. Second, an alternative socio-instrumental view on IT system use is elaborated. 
With this backdrop, the ATM example is used in a critical examination of instrumental 
and social aspects of action as a basis for reinterpreting the usability criteria 
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effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction. We then use this reinterpreted ‘socio-
instrumental’ usability concept to revisit the booking system case, originally reported 
by Ågerfalk (2004). Finally, after a discussion of the general usefulness of the theories 
introduced in the paper in the context of IT system design, the paper is concluded by a 
short summary of the main points. 
The Contemporary Instrumental View on Usability 
 
Several criteria for assessing the quality of IT systems have been proposed over the 
years. One basic criterion, stressed within the Software Engineering community, is that 
the IT system should meet the requirements of its users and other stakeholders. 
Requirements have traditionally been classified as either functional or non-functional 
(Sommerville, 1996). Functional requirements are concerned with what users possibly 
can do with a system – the functions, or services it provides. Non-functional 
requirements, on the other hand, are concerned with restrictions or constraints placed on 
such a system service. Following this dichotomy in requirements, the usefulness of a 
system has been described as the combination of its utility (functionality) and usability 
(Nielsen, 1993). As pointed out by Grudin (1992) and Bevan (1995) the distinction 
between usability and utility implies that it is possible to talk about IT systems that are 
usable but not useful. Bevan (1995) argues that this seemingly contradictory contention 
makes sense with a narrow ‘product oriented’ view of usability. With such a view, 
usability is only concerned with ease of use of the user interface (Holmlid, 2002). 
Another, broader approach, which is also one of the currently most widely adopted and 
cited definitions of usability, is that by The International Organization for 
Standardization, which identifies usability with the ability to use a product for its 
intended purposes: ‘the extent to which a product can be used by specified users to 
achieve specified goals with effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction in a specified 
context of use’ (ISO 9241-11, 1998). As reflected in this definition, three central 
criteria for usability are the effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction with which users 
can achieve specified goals. 
The first criterion, effectiveness, suggests that specified goals are to be achieved with 
accuracy and completeness (ISO 9241-11, 1998). Effectiveness can be understood as 
‘how good a system is at doing what it is supposed to do’ (Preece et al., 2002, p. 14) 
and is related to the ‘utility’ of the system (Grudin, 1992) – that is, ‘to the extent to 
which the system provides the right kind of functionality so that users can do what they 
need or want to do’ (Preece et al., 2002, p. 16). To get an operationalization of the 
effectiveness criterion we may turn to the MUSiC (Metrics for Usability Standards in 
Computing) Performance Measurement Method (Bevan, 1995). In MUSiC, measures of 
effectiveness relate goals of using an IT system to the accuracy and completeness with 
which these goals can be achieved. Completeness – the amount of a task completed by 
a user – is related to Quantity and Quality and is a measure of the degree to which the 
outcome achieves the task goals. In the ATM example, completeness would correspond 
to whether users manage to withdraw money (Quantity) and to the match between 
amount requested and that received (Quality). Both measures are expressed as 
percentages and are used together to calculate the effectiveness of a task as (Bevan, 
1995): Task Effectiveness = 1/100 (Quantity x Quality) %.  
The second criterion, efficiency, suggests that the expenditure of resources when 
achieving the specified goals should be minimized (ISO 9241-11, 1998). Put another 
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way, measures of efficiency relate the level of effectiveness achieved to the expenditure 
of resources (Bevan, 1995). According to Bevan (1995), resources may be ‘mental or 
physical effort, which can be used to give measures of human efficiency, or time, which 
can be used to give a measure of temporal efficiency, or financial cost, which can be 
used to give a measure of economic efficiency’. Following this definition, efficiency is 
calculated in the MUSiC Performance Measurement Method as (Bevan, 1995): 
Temporal Efficiency = Effectiveness / Task Time. 
The satisfaction criterion suggests that users should have positive attitudes towards the 
use of the system, and feel comfortable with using it (ISO 9241-11, 1998). In this sense, 
satisfaction relates to concepts such as ‘ease of use’ and ‘user satisfaction’ (Davis, 
1989; Mathieson and Keil, 1998). 
Finally, the ‘specified context of use’ includes users, tasks, equipment, and the physical 
environment. ‘Task’ is here thought of as the activities required to achieve a goal (ISO 
9241-11, 1998). Maguire (2001, p. 460) stresses the importance of the social context 
noting that ‘At a higher level, the attitudes of the organization and its employees 
towards the introduction of an IT system, and the way work is monitored, can affect 
whether a system is accepted and used to carry out the work. At a lower level the 
structure of the organization, the way people work (individually and in groups), the 
availability of assistance and the frequency of interruptions, are also likely to affect the 
usability of a product.’ 
Altogether, this view of user behaviour at the user interface of an IT system can be 
compared with the traditional so-called teleological action model. In this model the 
actor uses various means (instruments) to achieve his or her goals, that is, to accomplish 
desired effects. ‘When we describe behaviour as teleological action, we suppose that 
the agent reckons with an objective world in which he can know something and in 
which he can purposively intervene.’ (Habermas, 1984, p. 117) Actions are governed 
by action plans that actors choose, based on their interpretation of the action context 
and the goals to reach with the actions (Norman, 1988). According to Habermas (1984), 
such actions are founded in means/ends rationality. 
Within the teleological action model, action is often interpreted as an instrumental act. 
That is, the focus is on the means/ends rational behaviour of an actor and the means he 
uses to achieve subjective goals. Of course, actions performed in interaction with IT 
systems can be viewed as instrumental acts. To illustrate such an act we can return to 
the use of the ATM where the instrumental goal to be achieved is to obtain money. To 
achieve this goal, the action plan is to manoeuvre the ATM correctly (to push the right 
buttons in the correct order), the instruments used are the buttons on the ATM, the 
ATM card, the fingers to push with, et cetera, and the desired effect is that bills will 
eventually have been transferred from the machine to the user’s wallet. 
From certain points of view, means/ends rationality is appropriate in order to 
understand human action (Weber, 1978). This is, for example, the case when an actor 
follows technical rules to operate an IT system to achieve an instrumental goal in the 
way described above. In other cases, it is too restrictive a perspective. The reason is that 
in most use-situations other actors and social values, norms and consequences must be 
considered, and even if not explicitly considered they are still present. Specifically, it is 
important from a systems development perspective to make sure that the means/ends 
rationality of a user conforms to the overall social context in which the user acts, even 
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though the user may be unaware of, or uninterested in this larger context. As pointed 
out by Stamper (1996), excluding norms and attitudes from the study of IT systems 
‘would be like physics with the concept of energy but without the concept of mass.’ This 
view relates to the position of Goldkuhl and Lyytinen (1982) who state that 
‘information systems are social systems only technically implemented’, and this is thus 
where social action comes into play. 
It has long been claimed that computer systems need to be socially acceptable (e.g. 
Nielsen, 1993). Nielsen (1993), for example, states that ‘Given that a system is socially 
acceptable, we can further analyse its practical acceptability…’, which includes its 
functionality and usability (in the narrow sense). However, it is important to 
acknowledge that on one hand, usefulness must be related to social prerequisites, goals, 
norms, commitments and effects, and on the other hand social acceptability depends on 
the usefulness of the system. Furthermore, usefulness and social acceptability are not a 
property of the system being used but a property of the whole use-situation. This 
context dependency has convincingly been argued as imperative for the design of 
usable systems (Shackel, 1984; Bevan, 1999; Maguire, 2001) and is also reflected in the 
ISO definition of usability quoted above. However, such a claim does not necessarily 
mean that the use of the system is understood from a social action point-of-view; as we 
will show below, it depends on how we choose to interpret the concept of usability. 
Social Action Trough Information Technology 
 
In the teleological action model (described above), the actor is seen as a lonely and 
isolated actor making decisions and acting by oneself. However most actions are social 
to their character and instrumental actions are often performed in a social context, 
which means that we have to consider them as social actions.  Weber (1978, p. 4) made 
a classical definition of social action: ‘That action will be called “social” which in its 
meaning as intended by the actor or actors, takes account of the behaviour of others and 
is thereby oriented in its course.’ In the description of social action Weber (1978) 
stresses the meaningfulness of the act, because action is defined as meaningful 
behaviour: ‘We shall speak of action insofar as the acting individual attaches a 
subjective meaning to his behaviour.’ If the act is not made meaningful or if it is not 
interpreted as meaningful it will not be considered an action.   
The meaning of social actions can be analysed according to their orientation. Weber 
speaks of four different orientations of social action: instrumental orientation (goal 
orientation), value orientation, affectual orientation and traditional orientation.   
• Instrumental orientation: the goal is to affect the world in some intentional 
sense. This type of action is based on means-ends rationality.  
• Value orientation: the goal is to conform to values and norms, and the meaning 
lies within the behaviour itself, for example, religious, ethical or esthetical 
actions. This type of action is based on moral-practical rationality. 
• Affectual orientation: these actions are based on emotions. Weber considers this 
type of action meaningful, but not rational, because these actions are not 
necessarily based on meaningful goals. 
• Traditional orientation: these actions are governed by habits and traditions. This 
type of action is considered meaningful, but not rational, because they are not 
necessarily based on conscious goals.  
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Weber (1978) also points out that a social action seldom can be said to belong to one of 
the orientations above; hence they should not be thought of as types in a typological 
sense. An action can, for instance, be instrumentally oriented to some degree and value 
oriented to some degree. According to Weber (1978), rationality can be understood as a 
combination of means in relation to ends, ends in relation to values, and ethical 
principles (norms) in relation to action. This means that rational social action is always 
possible to relate to the means (instruments) used to achieve goals, and to values and 
norms to which the action conforms. The first aspect can be referred to as the 
instrumental aspect of the act, and the latter as the social aspect. Together the two 
aspects constitute an important part of a socio-instrumental orientation towards acting. 
This means that a social action has both instrumental and social goals, and this has 
implications for how to analyse action situations: we should consider both instrumental 
and social goals. Both instrumental and social goals can be evaluated subjectively. 
However, social goals have also to be considered inter-subjectively. This is because 
understanding and accomplishing a social goal requires at least two social actors; 
otherwise the goal is, as per the definition of social action above, not social.   
Since actions are oriented to the behaviour of other social actors (people and/or 
organizations) an understanding of social norms is required (Stamper et al., 2000). 
Social norms are rules that govern social action and these rules are oriented to social 
goals and values (Weber, 1978). Hence, norms are social rules that are based on another 
type of goal and rationality than technical rules. Norms are social rules based on values 
and human behaviour. Norms are not always tangible and ‘one cannot always put one’s 
hands conveniently on a norm. A norm is more like a field of force that makes the 
members of the community tend to behave or think in a certain way’ (Stamper et al., 
2000, p. 15). Social norms are (like technical rules) a basis for achieving instrumental 
goals because in a social context are required to follow social rules in order to perform 
a task. However norms are also a basis for evaluating to what extent actions are ‘good’ 
or ‘bad’, which means that norms are used for evaluating the quality of social actions 
and thus the behaviour of social actors. 
One particular type of social action is the communication act. In the Speech Act Theory 
(Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969), language is considered an instrument for human 
communication and social action within a social action context. Someone may perform 
a speech act (a communication act) to obtain instrumental goals (i.e. with a 
predominantly instrumental orientation). However, Searle (1969, p. 69) claims that a 
communication act should be analysed based on the speaker’s communicative (social) 
orientation. Searle maintains that the speaker’s communicative intent (i.e. social goal) is 
to make the listener understand what he is trying to do by a communication act. Perhaps 
one of the most important insights provided by speech act theory is that the use of 
language, and success of using it, is based on following a number of general rules 
(norms), and that a communication act must be understood and evaluated within a 
social context. Auramäki et al. (1988) describe this context as a combination of 
speaker, hearer, time, place and possible world. The first two concepts refer to the 
actors who perform and interpret the act, and time and place represent the temporal and 
spatial aspects of the act. The possible world includes shared norms, values and beliefs 
and the existence of certain social and material (brute) facts. 
Searle (1969) defined five pragmatic language functions representing five typical ways 
of using language, and corresponding social goal types (illocutionary points). As an 
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example, the aim of a request is that it should count as an attempt to get the listener to 
perform a subsequent action Searle (1969, p. 69). In a banking context, we can imagine 
that the customer walks up to the counter inside the bank and says ‘I would like to 
withdraw €50 from my account, please.’ In this case, the customer performs the 
communication act of making a request, and in doing so attempts to make the clerk 
perform the subsequent material act of handing out the money requested. The customer 
must in this case follow the general rules valid for such requests and the success of the 
speech act depends on how the customer performs the request and how the clerk 
interprets it, all within the actual social context. In order to succeed with his social act, 
the customer must make the clerk understand how much money he wants to withdraw, 
and, most importantly, that he is authorized to make the request. The clerk must, in 
order to interpret this request, relate it to the actual social context, in this case a banking 
context. This implies that the request must be related to established social norms and 
procedures within the bank, and within this specific customer-bank relationship. There 
is, for example, probably a standard procedure to check customers’ identity, which 
must be followed before the money is handed over. When people behave like this – 
interact to perform a task, orient towards mutual understanding, and conform to socially 
shared norms – they are basing their actions on communicative rationality and perform 
communicative action (Habermas, 1984).  
In communicative action, actors pursue their actions based on a common interpretation 
and mutual understanding (agreement) in a social context (Habermas, 1984). It is 
important to understand that ‘communicative action’ and ‘communication act’ are 
different but related concepts. Habermas (1984, p. 295) clarifies this accordingly: ‘… 
communication or speech acts function as a coordinating mechanism for other actions. 
“Acts of communication” should not be confused with what I introduced as 
communicative action.’ This distinction is important to understand because 
communicative action implies that a sequence of actions is performed which can 
include both communication acts (e.g. the request in the example) and material acts 
(e.g. handing out the money) which are co-ordinated by a mutual understanding in a 
social context. Communicative action is, according to Habermas (1998), a teleological 
language game co-ordinated by mutual understanding where actions are performed and 
interpreted, and where commitments are created and fulfilled. This means that 
communicative action is both instrumentally oriented, because people are interested in 
executing their action plans (to get something done), and socially oriented, because the 
actions are oriented towards mutual understandingi. Communication acts are the means 
by which such mutual understanding is created. Habermas explains that this is done by 
assessing the conditions under which the communication act is valid, based on the 
evaluation of three universal validity claims: 
1. The claim for truth can be discussed both in terms of conditions of satisfaction (i.e. 
what ought to be) and in terms of existential presuppositions (i.e. what is). If the 
claim for truth is accepted the actors can share a propositional knowledge; i.e. they 
can agree that a certain fact is indeed a fact. 
2. The claim for normative rightness means that the communication act has to be 
related to the normative context so that the communication act is considered as 
legitimate. This implies that the communication act must comply with established 
norms or rules otherwise it is not considered as valid. 
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3. The claim for sincerity (or truthfulness) means that the communication act should 
be based on the subjective sincerity of the actors so that the actors can trust each 
other.   
Habermas maintains that the three validity claims can be fulfilled in two ways: directly 
or indirectly. The claim for truth can be fulfilled directly through the certainty of 
presented facts, or indirectly in a discourse (conversation) providing the background to 
the presented facts. The claim for normative rightness can be fulfilled directly by 
referring (explicitly or implicitly) to an existing normative background, or indirectly in 
a discourse justifying why the communication act has to be considered legitimate. In 
the case of a discourse it is the validity of the normative background that is discussed. 
The claim for sincerity can be fulfilled through assurance of what appears to be credible 
behaviour, or indirectly by subsequent actions.  
The crucial point in all this is that even the use of a technical artefact such as an ATM 
can be viewed as communicative action. In this case a sequence of communication and 
material actions are performed at the interface of the ATM, and these actions should be 
based on mutual understanding.  Hence, the social context is more fundamental to IT 
use than the notion of context suggested by, for example, Maguire (2001). The social 
context is not just a complicating factor that must be considered. The social context is 
what makes the actions at the user interface meaningful in the first place and, as such, is 
not just ‘likely to affect the usability’ (Maguire, 2001, p. 460), but a basis for 
understanding usability altogether. 
Inside the bank, as well as at the ATM, the participating actors must live up to certain 
social goals, which are based on social norms (such as making the customer understand 
that he must provide evidence of his identity) in addition to achieving the instrumental 
goals (such as withdrawing money).  
Each of the two orientations, instrumental and social, is related to its own set of goals. 
The instrumental orientation is related to instrumental goals, which may be expressed 
in terms of achieving a given end. The social orientation is related to social goals, 
which may be expressed in terms of creating a mutual understanding based on the 
social context.  
When Habermas talks about the meaning and rationality of social action, he emphasizes 
the importance of the combination of these two aspects. He also relates the two aspects 
to two types of knowledge, or human interests: technical-cognitive knowledge, which is 
related to the instrumental aspect, and practical knowledge which is related to the social 
aspect. This knowledge can be made explicit and be developed in a systematic manner 
based on a broader concept of rationality. Habermas (1984, p. 335) writes ‘The aspects 
of rationality of action that we found in communicative action should now permit us to 
grasp processes of societal rationalization across their whole breadth, and no longer 
solely from the selective viewpoint of purposive-rational action.’ Habermas (1972) also 
refers to a third type of knowledge (or interest) – emancipatory knowledge – which is 
oriented towards self-knowledge and self-orientation and the forces that limit the 
emancipation of human beings. Although this is an important aspect of knowledge, it is 
the concept of communicative rationality that comes to the fore when Habermas talks 
about the rationality of social action (Habermas, 1984, pp. 334-335). Consequently, in 
order to evaluate the use of IT in a social action context, it is the effective instrumental 
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use of the technology and the mutual understanding of the social actors involved that 
should be given due consideration. 
In communicative action, actors pursue their actions within a ‘lifeworld’ (Habermas, 
1984, pp. 335-337). The lifeworld is ‘intuitively present’ in the form of taken-for-
granted background assumptions and naïvely taken for granted skills. For example, the 
tacit norms governing the routine use of the ATM is part of the actors’ lifeworld; they 
are commonsense certainties for the actors. 
As we shall see below, interpreting the concept of usability in a way that acknowledges 
social and not only instrumental goals can help us understand the usability of IT not 
only in terms of means-ends rational action, but based on communicative rationality. It 
can also help us reveal some of the tacit background knowledge and assumptions that 
are fundamental for the usability of IS.  
Usability in Social Action – A Critical Examination 
 
Let us now return to the ATM example and examine how usability can be understood 
from a social action point of view. To that end, five typical actions performed in 
interaction with the system will be analysed. Certainly, the description constitutes an 
oversimplification, but is sufficiently detailed for the aim of this paper. The ATM use-
situation is visualized in Figure 2 by use of a notation called an Action Diagram 
(Ågerfalk and Goldkuhl, 2001); see Figure 1 for a symbol legend. The Action Diagram 
utilizes an additional feature, rounded rectangles, to illustrate the main goals of each 
action, both social (dashed border) and instrumental (solid border).  
 
Action Diagram Symbol Legend
Information flow 
(communication)
Material flow
Numbered activity with named
Performers (the arrows indicate
the main direction of 
communication)
Material action object
Information action object 
(oral or written)
2. Enter PIN [Customer? ATM ? Bank]
Communicative goal
Instrumental goal
 
Figure 1: Action Diagram symbol legend. See Ågerfalk and Goldkuhl (2001) for further details. 
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1. Input Card Request [Bank ? ATM ? Customer]
Request
2. Enter PIN [Customer ? ATM ? Bank]
PIN Code
3. Request Money [Customer ? ATM ? Bank]
Request for 
Money
4. Hand Out Money [Bank ? ATM ? Customer]
Money
5. Abort Transaction [Bank? ATM ? Customer]
Abort 
Explanation
OR
The customer understands that he 
is being offered to use the ATM 
service given that he provides 
evidence that he is allowed to
The bank understands that 
the customer is authorized 
to use the ATM
The bank understands that 
the customer wants the bank 
to hand out the specified 
amount of money
The specified amount of 
money is handed out
The customer understands 
that the bank cannot hand 
out the money 
Not allowed to withdraw the 
requested amount
Allowed to withdraw the 
requested amount
 
Figure 2: Action Diagram showing the ATM use-context. 
 
It is important to recognize that all actions embody both an instrumental and a social 
aspect, which implies that: 
? the communication acts (Actions 1, 2, 3 and 5), can be related to both social and 
instrumental goals, but since they are socially oriented this implies that social 
goals should be emphasized when the quality of the acts are considered.  
? the quality of the material act (Action 4) should primarily be considered based 
on the instrumental goal of handing out money even though the action embodies 
also a subordinated social aspect. 
Action 1 – Input Card Request: The first act is a communication act in which the bank 
requests that the customer put the bankcard into the machine and enter a pin code. The 
social goals of the act are to make the customer understand that he is being offered use 
of the ATM service, and that he must provide evidence that he is allowed to (which is 
based on a commitment between the customer and the bank). This is thus a 
multifunctional communication act involving both an offer and a request. The 
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instrumental goal of the bank is to communicate these messages to the customer 
through the ATM user interface. If the customer understands this he can proceed to 
action 2. 
Action 2 – Enter PIN: The second act is a communication act in which the customer 
puts the bankcard into the machine and enters the associated PIN code.  The social goal 
of this action is to make the bank understand that the customer is authorized to use the 
ATM. This understanding rests on two conditions: (a) the customer has access to an 
authorized bankcard to identify himself to the bank; (b) the customer knows the PIN 
code associated with the bankcard. If these conditions are met, that is, if the bankcard is 
valid and the provided PIN code matches the bankcard, the bank gives the customer 
access to the ATM’s functionality. The instrumental goal of the customer is to manage 
to insert the card correctly and enter the corresponding PIN code. 
Action 3 – Request Money: The third act is a communication act in which the customer 
requests that the bank hand out a specified amount of money. The social goal is to make 
the bank understand that the customer wants the bank to hand out the money. This 
understanding rests on two conditions: (a) the customer has the right (i.e. is authorized) 
to make the request (this condition has already been tested during Action 2), and (b) the 
account balance is sufficient to cover the requested amount of money. If the bank 
(through the ATM-system) accepts that these conditions are fulfilled then the bank can 
perform Action 4, otherwise Action 5 is performed. The instrumental goal of the 
customer is to manoeuvre the ATM appropriately so that the request eventually reaches 
the bank. 
Action 4 – Hand Out Money: The fourth act is a material act in which the bank hands 
out the money to the customer. The instrumental goal of the act is to have the specified 
amount of money handed out. The money transfer depends on the condition that the 
ATM contains the required amount of bills. If the customer gets the money and verifies 
that the money received corresponds to the amount requested, then the customer is 
probably satisfied. Consequently, the social goal of the act is that the user understands 
and accepts the money as a response to his request. If the required amount of bills is not 
available, the customer is informed (by a further act) that there is not enough money in 
the ATM to hand out the money. The social goal of this further act is to make the 
customer understand that the ATM is out of bills. 
Action 5 – Abort Transaction: The fifth act is a communication act in which the bank 
communicates to the customer that the bank cannot hand out the requested amount of 
money. The social goal of the action is to make the user understand that the bank 
cannot hand out the money. This understanding rests on the condition that there is an 
agreement between the bank and the customer committing them not to create a negative 
account balance. If the user understands this condition he understands why the bank is 
not allowed to hand out the money. The instrumental goal of the bank is to have the 
information communicated to the customer through the ATM user interface. 
As we can see, Actions 1, 2, 3 and 5 are oriented towards the overall social goal of 
creating a mutual understanding, while Action 4 is oriented towards the customer’s 
desired outcome in terms of getting the money out of the machine. What is important to 
emphasize from a social action point of view is the importance of the social goals and 
their role in ensuring that the actions are performed not only in an efficient but also in a 
socially acceptable way. For example, Actions 1 and 2 are mainly performed in order to 
 13
secure that the transaction is performed based on social norms governing the 
interaction. What is in focus here is whether the customer is allowed to use the ATM, 
not the instrumental goal of fetching the money. The social goal of Action 3 is related 
to whether the customer is allowed to withdraw the requested amount of money, and 
this action rests on a prior mutual commitment between the customer and the bank that 
the customer is not allowed to create a negative balance in his account. These social 
goals are essential for the design of the ATM and how the customer experiences the 
use-situation. If the customer, for example, tries to make a request that would have 
created a negative balance on his account, it is important that he understands that he is 
not allowed to withdraw this amount. It would probably be hard for the customer to 
trust a bank with an ATM that did not check if the request would create a negative 
account balance, or even worse, did not check if the user was authorized to use the 
ATM. 
If we compare the analysis presented above to how Maguire (2001, p. 466) analyses the 
ATM use-situation we see that  he identifies one primary user: the Bank Customer, and 
three secondary users: Bank Staff, Machine Maintenance Staff and Security Staff. None 
of the latter three represents the bank as an institution, i.e. as a social actor that uses the 
ATM as a social agent performing social actions. The secondary actors described are 
only concerned with keeping the ATM up and running. Furthermore the ‘main task 
goals’ of the Bank Customer identified in the study are:  
• To obtain money 
• To request information (statement or balance) 
• To order a cheque book or statement 
• To perform account transactions and pay bills 
• To open and close an account 
• To obtain an alternative bank service, e.g. order foreign currency, set up a loan, set 
up savings, insurance or pension scheme. 
All of these identified goals are clearly instrumentally oriented and need to be 
complemented with other socially oriented goals. Analysing the use-situation along 
these lines is crucial from a social action-perspective since, as described above, social 
action is concerned not only with how to perform actions efficiently but it is also 
concerned with the goodness and the moral-practical rationality of the actions, and the 
trust of social actors (individuals as well as organizations). In addition it implies that in 
order to understand the use-situation, both the designers and the actors that use the 
system (i.e. the bank and the customer in this case), must have a thorough 
understanding of the social context in which the system is being used. It is not only a 
matter of reaching the instrumental goal of getting the money out of the machine; it is 
also a matter of whether this is done in a socially acceptable way. It is therefore 
insufficient to analyse the ATM case in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and 
satisfaction with an instrumental orientation alone. These criteria should be interpreted 
based on a socio-instrumental orientation that includes the social aspect of action. 
Reinterpreting Effectiveness, Efficiency and Satisfaction 
 
If we analyse the three usability criteria, effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction, with 
a socio-instrumental mental orientation we can see that it is highly relevant to speak of 
instrumental effectiveness and efficiency in terms of desired outcome and relative 
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expenditure of resources, and instrumental satisfaction as comfort and positive attitudes 
towards a system. However, if we choose to broaden the view and take into account 
also social aspects, we can interpret the three criteria in a more elaborate way (see 
Table 1). 
Table 1: Interpretation of effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction with a socio-instrumental 
orientation. 
Socio-instrumental orientation 
Usability criteria 
Instrumental aspect Social aspect 
Effectiveness Desired outcome Mutual understanding 
Efficiency Relative expenditure of resources N/A 
Satisfaction Comfort and positive attitudes Trust 
 
As described above, the first criterion, effectiveness, suggests that specified goals are to 
be achieved with accuracy and completeness (ISO 9241-11, 1998). With a socio-
instrumental orientation, IT systems should be designed so as to facilitate mutual 
understanding. The main point of a socially oriented goal such as mutual understanding 
is that it is the validity of the goal that should be evaluated, not the task effectiveness in 
terms of percentages. Therefore, it is not feasible to evaluate mutual understanding with 
formulas such as the one presented above. Of course actions must also contribute to 
task effectiveness, but this is not enough (it is a necessary but not sufficient condition). 
In order to understand the usability of an IT system we must consider the validity and 
meaning of the social goals and the social actions performed by use of the system, 
which is another matter (Eriksson, 2002). This implies another way of interpreting and 
evaluating effectiveness; we need to evaluate the social effectiveness. As a consequence 
we must learn how to evaluate social actions based on their meaning and validity. In 
order to understand the meaning of social actions we have to know under what 
conditions (as derived from the social context) they are acceptable based on validity 
(Habermas, 1984, p. 115). 
The second criterion, efficiency, suggests that specified goals are to be achieved with as 
little expenditure of resources as possible (ISO 9241-11, 1998). Mutual understanding 
is hard to relate to the expenditure of resources and therefore it seems meaningless to 
speak of efficiency in relation to social goals (Ngwenyama and Lee, 1997). Of course, 
communication and the performance of action by use of language can indeed be 
analysed in terms of efficiency. In this respect it is important to see that the 
performance of a communication act includes both an instrumental and a social aspect. 
That is, when performing a communication act at the interface, we also use the system 
(and our language) in an instrumental way, and this use can be related to the relative 
expenditure of resources.  
The third criterion, satisfaction, is the subjective criterion used for describing and 
measuring the actors’ (users’) feelings and attitudes towards the system and the 
achieving of the goals that make a system effective. Hence, it is usually described in a 
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way that has bearing towards an instrumental orientation. When relating the criterion to 
a socio-instrumental orientation, social satisfaction has to be associated with the inter-
subjectivity of social action – the trust communicating actors have in each other as well 
as in the system and the actions performed through and by means of IT (cf. Cardholm, 
1999). Habermas (1979) claims that mutual understanding must include mutual trust. In 
order to act with the aim of creating mutual understanding, the actors must rely on a 
social context, which includes actors, norms and institutions. Trust is essentially based 
on faith in others’ word and the legitimacy of regulations, and underlines the 
importance of belief in other people (Ngwenyama and Lee, 1997; Salaün and Flores, 
2001). ‘The best way to understand trust is to see it as a property of the relationship 
between parties, not as a property of an individual. There is trust between parties if each 
of the interacting parties acknowledges the right of the other parties to assess the 
competence and the positive intentions of their acts.’ (van der Smagt, 2000, p. 153). 
Trust can be described as the notions of credibility or the beliefs that another party can 
be relied on to fulfil written and spoken promises (Coote et al, 2002). This implies that 
keeping promises and fulfilling commitments is essential for building trust between 
social actors. A mutual commitment is an engagement to take on obligations together 
with other social actors to act in a certain way in the future (Habermas, 1979). 
According to Habermas (1979), the sincerity of the actors is essential in order to 
generate trust and that the sincerity of the actors is proved by how they fulfil their 
obligations and commitments. It is also recognized that conflicts occur and trust is 
eroded when explicit and implicit agreements are violated (Coote et al, 2002). This 
means that taking on responsibilities and proving in action that these responsibilities are 
carried out is crucial when it comes to building and sustaining trust. Therefore, 
satisfaction is not only a property of a user’s interaction with a system but also of an 
actor’s participation in a social action context. 
Socio-Instrumental Usability – A Case Study 
 
In this section we will use our reinterpreted usability concept to reanalyse a case study 
previously reported by Ågerfalk (2004). The original study was performed with the aim 
of developing and validating criteria for evaluation of an information system’s 
actability. As pointed out in the introduction, the concept of actability is one of the new 
‘-bilites’ that aim to go beyond a limited notion of usability restricted to an instrumental 
orientation. Our analysis shows how problems identified and insights gained by 
applying the actability concept can be explained by our reinterpreted ‘socio-
instrumental’ concept of usability, hence supporting our claim that ‘usability’ can 
indeed be used to understand also the socially oriented aspects of IT use.  
Case Description  
The following case description is based on Ågerfalk’s (2004) description of the same 
system. Please refer to this ‘original’ publication for further details, screen shots, et 
cetera. 
The Booking System is a subsystem of a corporate intranet that provides services for 
booking resources, such as rooms and extra equipment for meetings. The intranet as a 
whole is a database-driven web-based system used corporation-wide in a large 
manufacturing company. It is mainly used to provide information to employees, but 
includes also, besides the Booking System, facilities such as a phone book for 
managing contacts. 
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Booking a resource is a social activity involving people in different roles interacting 
through different parts of the system. This activity is supported by number of web 
pages used by Resource Bookers, Resource Owners and Resource Managers.  
Any employee who has been granted rights to book resources can act as a Resource 
Booker. Using a resource search facility, the first step in booking a resource is typically 
to find a suitable resource, such as a meeting room. The current booking status of this 
resource can then be found using the Resource Schedule. The Resource Schedule is a 
matrix of time slots showing all bookings of a resource for a given week. The actual 
booking is done using a Booking Form, which can be accessed by clicking on a time 
slot in the Resource Schedule. 
Using the Booking Form, the Resource Booker chooses a desired time interval, 
describes the Purpose of using the resource, and clicks the Request Resource button. 
Depending on whether or not the resource in question requires an acknowledgement 
from the Resource Owner, i.e. the person responsible for that resource (see below), this 
particular button is labelled either ‘Request Resource’ or ‘Book Resource’. The bottom 
part of the Booking Form also shows current bookings and pending requests that 
overlap with the current one, should any such exist. As an example, let us assume that 
Ågerfalk’s (2004) fictitious Orla Donovan has booked the room called The Elk for a 
project kick-off. Now, Lars Anderson requires this particular room this particular time 
for a (potentially more important) board meeting. Although already booked by Orla and 
confirmed by the Resource Owner, he may request the resource anyway hoping that the 
Resource Owner responsible for The Elk shows understanding. This resource is now 
booked and has an additional request pending, which is communicated to all bookers by 
means of two differently coloured patches in the relevant time slot of the Resource 
Schedule. 
A person who is responsible for one or more resources is referred to as a Resource 
Owner. In particular cases, Resource Owners are required to acknowledge booking 
requests. This would typically be the case should a resource require extra precaution as 
to who books it for what purpose. Resource Owners also have the authority to cancel 
already confirmed bookings, which thus is what our fictitious Lars is hoping for.  
Resource Owners effectuate such decisions at the bottom of the Booking Info page. 
This page is also used to show information about particular bookings. Clicking a little 
‘i’ in the coloured ‘booking’ patches of the Resource Schedule loads a Booking Info 
page with information about that particular booking. Should this page be viewed by a 
Resource Owner who is responsible for a resource with a booking request pending, a 
status line reading ‘This booking awaits a confirmation from the person responsible for 
the resource’ would appear, and two options –  ‘Approve’ and ‘Deny’ – would be 
visible at the bottom of the Booking Info page. Generally, the status of a booking is 
expressed using one of the following three phrases: 
(a) Status:  This booking awaits a confirmation from the person responsible for 
the resource. 
(b) Status:  This booking is confirmed by the person responsible for the 
resource. 
(c) Status:  This booking has been denied by the person responsible for the 
resource. 
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The Booking Info page also displays the names of the relevant Resource Booker and up 
to two Resource Owners.  
When a Resource Booker requests a resource, the appointed resource owners get 
notified by a flashing exclamation mark on their system start page. This indicates that 
they have received a new Resource Message, accessible through the Resource Message 
List. The Resource Message List contains all resource messages received by a user and 
provides hypertext links to the relevant Booking Info. A Resource Message typically 
states when the message was sent, a topic (e.g. ‘Your booking of the Elk’), the relevant 
timeslot of the booking, and a property of the booking (e.g. ‘Has been approved’ or 
‘Has been cancelled’). Resource Messages are thus also the means by which Resource 
Bookers get notified of approved bookings and revoked approvals (cancelled 
bookings).  
The third and final actor role central to the Resource Booking system is the Resource 
Manager. Resource Managers are responsible for setting up and administering all 
resources in the Intranet. To create, delete and edit properties of specific resources, 
Resource Managers use the Resource Management document in conjunction with a list 
of resources resulting from a resource search. Managing resources also includes the 
allocation of Resource Owners and deciding whether or not a resource requires 
Resource Owner acknowledgement prior to booking. 
Understanding Resource Booking  
From an instrumental point of view, booking of resources can be seen as the reading 
and updating of the database of the Booking System. However, from a socio-
instrumental perspective it is important to see those activities as part of a social action 
context involving several different actors performing social actions. Some important 
communication acts and corresponding messages communicated between actors in this 
context are shown in Figure 3 (please refer to Figure 1 for a symbol legend). Similar to 
Figure 1, Figure 3 also shows the main social goals associated with each act. In the 
remainder of this section, we will analyse these acts from a socio-instrumental point of 
view and show how they could be understood in terms of our reinterpreted usability 
concept. 
 
We will focus our description of the acts on social and instrumental effectiveness and 
on social satisfaction. Efficiency, which by definition is instrumentally oriented (see 
above), has to do with the relative expenditure of resources in attaining instrumental 
goals. Strategies for maximizing efficiency are well-covered in the existing usability 
literature (e.g. Preece et al., 1994; Shneiderman, 1998; van Welie et al., 1999), and we 
do not want to reiterate that here. In general, efficiency in the context of the Booking 
System could be achieved through appropriately designed user interfaces, along the 
lines of the many ‘traditional’ usability guidelines and checklists (e.g. Nielsen, 1994; 
ISO 9241-10, 1996; Shneiderman, 1998; van Welie et al., 1999), and by appropriate 
optimisation of the database and network infrastructure. In a similar vein, instrumental 
satisfaction would generally have been achieved if the users involved feel that they can 
perform their interactive tasks related to the different actions without unnecessary 
hassle, if the user interface is aesthetically pleasing, et cetera. 
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1. Declare a Resource [RM ? RO, RB]
Resource 
Description
2. Request a Resource [RB ? RO, RB]
Request 
Report
3. Respond to Request [RO ? RB]
Booking 
Decision
4. Cancel a Booking [RO? RB]
Cancel Booking 
Decision
Resource Bookers understand 
that they are allowed to book the 
resource
Other Resource Bookers 
understand that the resource 
has been requested
Resource Booker understands 
that the resource is or isn’t 
reserved as requested
The affected Resource 
Booker understands that 
the resource is no longer 
reserved 
Resource 
Request
Resource Manager 
understands that Resource 
Booker requests specified 
Resource
Resource Owner 
Appointment
Resource Owner 
understands that he/she
is responsible for the 
specified Resource
Booking 
Decision Report
Other Resource Bookers 
understand that the resource is 
either booked or no longer 
requested
Cancel Decision 
Report
Other Resource Bookers 
understand that the specified 
resource is no longer booked
 
Figure 3: Action Diagram showing the resource booking context. RM is short for Resource 
Manager, RO is short for Resource Owner, and RB is short for Resource Booker. 
Action 1 – Declare a Resource as Available for Booking: Before a resource can be 
booked it must be made available for booking. This is a communication act in which 
the Resource Manager produces a resource description and declares that the resource is 
available for booking. Declaring a resource as available for booking also includes 
appointing one or two resource owners. The social effectiveness of this act is to do with 
making the Resource Owner understand that they are responsible for the specified 
Resource, and to make Resource Bookers understand that the resource in question is 
possible to book. This act is thus multifunctional, involving both an appointment and a 
declaration (both of which would be declaratives according to Searle’s classification, 
but it is important to see that they are directed towards two different actor roles). The 
success of the appointment relies on the assumption that the person appointed as 
Resource Owner understands and accepts that responsibility. Hence, to achieve social 
satisfaction in these acts, Resource Managers need to be able to trust that the Resource 
Owner takes responsibility for the resource and acts in accordance to that responsibility. 
Similarly, the Resource Owners must trust that they are in fact trusted with that 
responsibility. The instrumental effectiveness of the act is to do with ensuring that the 
required information is provided to the Booking System by updating the database, and 
that this information is communicated (as in transmitted) to the intended people.  
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Action 2 – Request a Resource: Requesting a resource is a communication act 
performed by a Resource Booker, directed towards the Resource Owner responsible for 
that resource. This also includes reporting to other bookers that the request has been 
made. The social effectiveness of this act relates to making the Resource Owner 
understand that the Resource Booker requests the specified resource, and to make other 
Resource Bookers understand that the resource has been requested. Social satisfaction 
would thus mean that the Resource Booker trusts that their request will be expedited 
and that they will not be sidestepped by other Bookers, at least not without a good 
reason. Similarly, the Resource Owner and other Resource Bookers must trust that the 
request is a valid one, i.e. that the Resource Booker actually intends to use the resource 
and has the formal right to book it, et cetera. For the act to be instrumentally effective, 
it should indeed initiate the process of ensuring the Resource Bookers eventual access 
to the resource.  
Action 3 – Respond to Request: When receiving a booking request, the appointed 
Resource Owner is required to decide whether or not to approve it. This decision is 
communicated to the requesting Resource Booker through their Resource Message List, 
and is also reported to other bookers by means of the status shown in the Booking Info 
and by the colour of the corresponding timeslot in the Resource Schedule. Note that for 
our analysis we follow Ågerfalk’s (2004) lead and regard the case of booking without 
explicit approval as a special case of requesting a resource where the approval is 
delegated to the Booking System itself, which thus approves requests automatically on 
behalf of the Resource Owner (cf. Goldkuhl and Ågerfalk, 2002; Ågerfalk, 2004). This 
act would be socially effective if it makes the requesting Resource Booker understand 
whether or not their request has been fulfilled, and makes other Resource Bookers 
understand that the resource is either booked or no longer requested (depending on the 
decision). For this to be socially satisfactory, the Resource Bookers have to trust the 
judgement of the Resource Owner and accept their decision, whether or not they 
actually like it. The instrumental goal of the act is to mark the resource as booked or as 
available in the Booking System (again, depending on the decision) and that this new 
status is accessible by Resource Bookers.  
Action 4 – Cancel a Booking: As described above, a previously approved booking may 
subsequently be cancelled at the discretion of the Resource Owner. This is a 
communication act in which the Resource Owner tells a previously successful Resource 
Booker that their booking is no longer valid. This also includes informing other 
Resource Bookers that the resource is no longer booked. This act would be socially 
effective if it makes the affected Resource Booker understand that the resource is no 
longer reserved, and to make other Resource Bookers understand that the specified 
resource is available. For this to be socially satisfactory, the Resource Bookers have to 
trust the judgement of the Resource Owner and accept their decision, which could be 
difficult in this case because there might be a risk that the let down Resource Booker 
would not like the decision.  The instrumental goals of the act are to change the status 
of the resource in the Booking System to reflect its availability and specifically to make 
the previously successful booker aware of the changed circumstances.   
Revisiting a Selection of Resource Booking Problems 
As can be seen from the above description of the resource booking context, all four 
actions are intrinsically related to both instrumental and social goals. In order to 
exemplify this we will revisit some empirical insights reported by Ågerfalk (2004) who 
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studied the Booking System in use and interviewed a number of users. These examples 
are also intended to show that what Ågerfalk (2004) identified by investigating a 
number of ‘actability dimensions’ is possible also to identify, explain and even 
elaborate further by using the socio-instrumental concept of usability introduced in this 
paper. 
As discussed above, some resources can be booked and approved directly without 
requiring ‘manual’ approval (Action 1 + Action 2). This means that the approval 
(Action 2) is delegated to the Booking System in some cases. A problem pointed out by 
Ågerfalk (2004) is that it is not the Resource Owner, but a Resource Manager, that 
makes such delegations effective. This act of appointing a Resource Owner (Action 1) 
can be done without the Resource Owner been notified or accepted the appointment, 
which thus means that the ‘resource owner appointment’ message in Figure 3 is not 
always communicated and acknowledged. Although there are manual routines to make 
sure Resource Owners are informed about their responsibilities, there is no support for 
this in the system. This lack of instrumental effectiveness led to situations in which 
Resource Owner did not know that Resource Bookers regarded them as guaranteeing 
resource availability; a Resource Owner did in fact not know whether or not he was 
responsible for any resources at all at the time. Hence, the social goal of making 
Resources Owners aware of, and taking on their responsibilities was seriously 
compromised. Furthermore, due to the lack of search facilities and required manual 
routines, a resource owner who has quit the job may still be ‘appointed’ as responsible 
for a resource in the system. A condition considered to be a ‘weak link’ by the resource 
manager (Ågerfalk, 2004, p. 981). Thus, the social goal of making Resource Bookers 
understand who to turn to when requesting a specific resource (as part of the results of 
Action 1 and facilitated by the Resource Description message) was not supported by the 
system. 
When requesting a resource (Action 2), the Booking System states explicitly that the 
Resource Owner’s decision (Action 3) can be expected within five days. At times, one 
resource owner did not get requests in due time since he was frequently out of the 
office. Therefore, the commitment to Resource Bookers was seldom fulfilled. As a 
consequence, the acknowledgement was not considered very important (Ågerfalk, 
2004, p. 981): ‘If a request is pending, no one requests that resource anyway. And if the 
resource is still [physically] available [at the time it is needed], they [the requesting 
booker] will use it anyway.’ (expressed by a Resource Owner during an interview). 
This means that the social goals of Action 2 were often neither achieved, nor mutually 
agreed upon. This mismatch between the commitment made in the system and the 
actual work process meant that different people interpreted the Request Report 
differently; often it was taken to mean the same as a confirmatory Booking Decision 
Report (i.e. it was considered that the goals of Action 3 were fulfilled).  
It is not enough only to make sure that the database of the Booking System reflects that 
a booking has been cancelled and that let down Resource Bookers are informed (Action 
4). This must also be possible to accomplish in a socially acceptable way. The Booking 
System did not provide an opportunity to explain and justify why a booking was 
cancelled, which was why one of the Resource Owners did not find the facility of 
cancelling accepted bookings useful. In an interview this was expressed as (Ågerfalk, 
2004, p. 983): ‘I believe that you should call and check with the person who has booked 
the resource […] Perhaps they have booked a lot of people for a course […] You want 
to know why your reservation is cancelled not only that it is cancelled.’ Hence, due to 
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the lack of facilities for providing let down bookers with an explanation, the possibility 
of cancelling bookings in a socially acceptable way was seriously compromised. As a 
consequence the cancelling function was not used at all by the interviewed user.  
Altogether these three examples show that it is of vital importance to consider social 
goals and social effectiveness in addition to the more traditional instrumental aspects of 
IT use when considering the usability of the Booking System. They also show that the 
two aspects of instrumentality and sociality are intrinsically intertwined and all of the 
actions are oriented to both. Each orientation helps us focusing different important 
aspects, and to assure completeness none of them should be left out of a usability study. 
Discussion 
 
In our attempt to understand usability from a social action perspective on IT use we 
have relied heavily on the social action theories by Weber (1978) and Habermas (1984). 
These are, of course, not the only alternatives for bringing in a social perspective and 
many other theoretical frameworks have been suggested in the literature, such as 
Activity Theory (Kuutti, 1996), Actor Network Theory (Walsham, 1997) and 
ethnomethodologically  inspired theories of situated action (Suchman, 1987; Dourish, 
2001). The reason for favouring the communicative action theory of Habermas (1984) 
is that in this theory the concept of action is analysed both from an instrumental and a 
social perspective. It is important not to delimit the use of IT systems to an instrumental 
activity that ignores the social and organizational context in which the system is used. If 
we reduce the use of IT systems to an instrumental activity we may fail to see that use 
of IT is based on communication and the use of language. The advantage of the 
communicative action theory is that it shows that a communication act is a social act 
that must be evaluated and understood within a social context. This implies that we 
cannot only consider instrumental goals when we evaluate the use of IT we must also 
consider social goals.  
A further issue concerns the relationship between Habermas’ theory of communicative 
action and the idea that an IT system can be viewed as an agent acting on the behalf of 
human beings and their organizations. Typically an IT system can be used to 
communicate automatically, as in the case of the ATM. These ideas help us to 
understand that the customer is not as isolated as it may seem; merely performing 
instrumental acts at the interface of the ATM. There is at least one other social actor 
involved, i.e. the bank as an institution and hence a social actor. Consequently the use 
situation must be understood in the light of social action where both instrumental and 
social goals have to be considered.   However, the IT system can never be looked upon 
as an actor in the ‘true’ meaning of the concept; a concept associated with the idea of a 
person with intentions, a free will and responsibilities. This implies that an artefact such 
as an IT system can only be considered as an agent that performs acts on behalf of a 
person or organization who is the ‘true actor’ behind the system (Goldkuhl and 
Ågerfalk, 2002). This is important to emphasize because if something goes wrong when 
the system is used we cannot blame the system. We have to look for the person or 
institution that is responsible for the actions (i.e. for the undesired behaviour of the 
system). 
In this work we have used the theories of Weber and Habermas to reinterpret the 
usability concept from a social action perspective. Habermas’ theory of communicative 
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action has also been used in many other areas of IT research. It has, for example, been 
used as a basis for business modelling (e.g. Goldkuhl, 2001; Dietz, 2001), 
understanding groupware (Lyytinen and Ngwenyama, 1999), investigating information 
retrieval interaction (Kwong, 2002), user interface evaluation criteria (Ågerfalk, 2004), 
and conceptual modelling (Ågerfalk and Eriksson, 2004), as well as in general 
conceptualizations of information systems development (Hirschheim et al., 1996). 
Nonetheless, it is worth noticing that the use of this particular theory has been both 
criticized and questioned (e.g. Ljungberg and Holm, 1996; Sharrock and Button, 1997; 
Brooke, 2002). Ljungberg and Holm (1996) criticize how the theories of speech acts 
and communicative action have been used as a foundation for IT systems design. 
Instead of using these theories to structure and formalise human communication and 
work they suggest using the theory of communicative action as a vehicle for reflection. 
This is in line with what we suggest in this paper, namely using communicative action 
theory to discuss and reflect upon how the usability concept could be reinterpreted in a 
social action context. Sharrock and Button (1997) set out to criticize Habermas’ project 
in general, and in particular Ngwenyama and Lyytinen’s (1997) use of Habermasian 
reasoning to understand groupware. In their reply to the critique, Lyytinen and 
Ngwenyama (1999, p. 285) write: ‘We see our work rather as one possible voice in 
CSCW research […] that desires to obtain a deeper understanding of how the social 
becomes embedded in the technical systems. From another perspective we can say that 
we are interested in how social ideas and theories are necessary and constitutive in 
building any groupware platform’. The aim of this paper clearly relates to this statement 
because we believe, in line with Lyytinen and Ngwenyama, that it is important to 
understand how the social aspect becomes embedded in technical systems, and, 
according to our opinion this is important for all types of IT systems not only 
groupware. We also believe, in line with these authors, that it is important to show how 
social ideas and theories are necessary and constitutive for both evaluation and design 
of IT systems.  
Conclusion 
 
This paper has suggested taking social action as the theoretical point of departure for 
understanding the usability of IT systems. By use of an ATM example, it has been 
shown how the traditional criteria used to understand IT use in terms of effectiveness, 
efficiency and satisfaction can be reinterpreted from a social action perspective. This 
reinterpreted concept of ‘socio-instrumental’ usability was then used as a tool to discus 
a number of problems in a booking system used by a large manufacturing company. 
The main point stressed by this socio-instrumental usability is that when IT systems are 
used in a social action context they can be used to perform communication acts. All 
communication acts have both an instrumental aspect and a social aspect and it is 
possible to extract complementary success criteria for such actions from different 
perspectives. In order to understand the usability of an IT system, it is important not 
only to consider a ‘cognitive-instrumental rationality, concerned with the evaluation of 
objective facts’ (Ehn and Löwgren, 1997, p. 308). That is, we can choose to view an 
action from an instrumental perspective. In this case, the success of the action can be 
judged based on achievement of desired outcome, relative expenditure of resources and 
subjective comfort and positive attitudes towards the IT system. The same act can also 
be viewed from a social perspective. In that case, the successful performance of the act 
can be judged based on established mutual understanding and achieved inter-subjective 
trust. 
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A problem with the contemporary understanding of usability is that it is often expressed 
in terms of achieving goals, which, at least tacitly, seem to be limited to goals restricted 
to the instrumental aspect of social action, as can be seen in, for example, the work of 
Bevan (1995) and Maguire (2001). The argument of this paper has been that in order to 
fully understand usability, and to establish usability as the important concept it 
deserves, we must consider both instrumental and social goals since their combination 
constitute a fundamental part of the social action context in which systems are used, 
and both instrumental and social goals affect the way systems and use-situations are 
designed and conceived. 
Designing usable IT systems requires understanding the social action context in which 
systems are going to be used, which is more than understanding users’ instrumental 
goals and an objective context of use. Rather, it is to understand social norms and 
commitments and related social goals that govern social action. This implies that 
designers must not only tacitly have a feeling for social norms and goals governing the 
use of the system but that such norms and goals must be explicated and analysed during 
design. This is necessary in order to achieve usability in social action by intention 
rather than by chance. It would, for example, be quite possible to view the social goal 
of making the bank understand that the customer is authorized to use the ATM (see 
Action 2 in the ATM example above) only as a sub-goal to the instrumental goal of 
having the ATM handing out the money, that is, only something that has to be done in 
order to get the money. Similarly, although making sure that the database of the 
Booking System is updated to reflect the status of a booking (an instrumental goal) is 
important, it is worth little if the people who depend on that information cannot trust it 
or perhaps do not even understand what it means. However, if these goals are viewed as 
belonging to different goal classes (social and instrumental), and a general rule is that 
all goals of both classes should be met, we do not run the risk of incorrectly viewing the 
instrumental goal as the ultimate, with the risk of ignoring the social goal. This is 
important since social goals and the norms related to them govern the interaction and 
are an important prerequisite for understanding the usability of IT. 
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Endnote 
                                                 
i It is, of course, also possible to act without the intent of creating mutual understanding; for 
example, to deliberately violate norms in order to deceive and manipulate other actors. Such 
strategic action (Habermas, 1984) may be important in order to understand systems 
development as an activity (Hirschheim et al., 1996). Even more important to see is that in most 
moral-practical senses, supporting such actions should not be a goal of systems design (cf. 
Ljungberg and Holm, 1996). 
